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In the hope of sparking more entrepreneurship, many countries have substantially 
invested in entrepreneurship education at universities (Brush et al., 2003; Katz, 2003), high 
schools (EACEA, 2012; Peterman and Kennedy, 2003; Sánchez, 2013), and even primary 
schools (Huber et al., 2014). This has increased scholarly interest in the outcomes of such 
efforts (Dickson et al., 2008; Gorman et al., 1997; Pittaway and Cope, 2007). While most 
studies suggest that entrepreneurship education fosters entrepreneurial intentions and thus 
entrepreneurial activity (e.g., Kautonen et al., 2015; Peterman and Kennedy, 2003; Rauch and 
Hulsink, 2014; Sánchez, 2013; Souitaris et al., 2007; Walter et al., 2013), there is also 
evidence of a negative, discouraging effect of entrepreneurship education (Oosterbeek et al., 
2010; von Graevenitz et al., 2010). These mixed findings could indicate that environmental 
contingencies condition the outcomes of entrepreneurship education (De Clercq et al., 2013; 
Walter and Dohse, 2012).1 Indeed, scholars have long viewed entrepreneurship as a result of a 
person-context interaction (Learned, 1992; Herron and Sapienza, 1992; Naffziger et al., 1994) 
and recent meta-analyses have warranted more research into potential moderators of 
education effects (Bae et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2013; Unger et al., 2011). However, to date, 
there is little research into this direction (Pittaway and Cope, 2007), although it promises 
interesting insights into how entrepreneurial decision-making is embedded in the national 
context (Shepherd, 2011). 
To address this gap, our study explores how the relationship between entrepreneurship 
education, i.e., the degree to which an individual believes that such education has successfully 
formed her entrepreneurial attitudes and skills, and entrepreneurial activity, i.e., the 
likelihood of being self-employed at a given time, is conditioned by a country’s institutional 
                                                 
1  De Clercq et al. (2013) found that institutions in a country moderate the relationship between an individual’s 
human capital and the likelihood of starting a new business. Walter and Dohse (2012) showed that the effect of 
reflective, but not active modes of entrepreneurship education depends on the regional context. 
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context.2 Drawing on institutional theory (North, 1990; Whitley, 1999) and the model of 
entrepreneurial action (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006), we posit that entrepreneurship 
education stimulates entrepreneurial activity in entrepreneurship-hostile institutional 
environments rather than, as also seems intuitively plausible, in entrepreneurship-friendly 
institutional environments. Consistent with Whitley’s (1999; 2002) comparative business 
systems perspective, our study covers five characteristics of a country’s institutional profile, 
including entrepreneur-friendly regulations, financial capital availability, educational capital 
availability, control of corruption, and the public image of entrepreneurs. Specifically, we 
argue that these five institutional characteristics affect the monetary and non-monetary payoff 
of entrepreneurship and that in entrepreneurship-friendly institutional environments 
individuals can acquire entrepreneurial motivation and qualification also from other sources 
than entrepreneurship education. 
Multilevel analyses of data from 11,230 individuals in 32 countries provide support for 
our arguments. Overall, this study bridges, theoretically and empirically, different levels of 
analysis by exploring how country-level institutions condition the effect of individual-level 
entrepreneurship education on subsequent entrepreneurial activity. The study makes two key 
contributions. First, prior empirical research on entrepreneurship education has been limited 
to the individual level and has—typically as a matter of research design—factored out 
country-level influences (e.g., Rauch and Hulsink, 2014; Souitaris et al., 2007). Our findings 
extend this literature by showing that better understanding educational outcomes requires 
considering a country’s institutional environment. This insight is also important for policy-
makers and educators who face increasing pressures to justify investments into education and 
to benchmark educational outcomes internationally (OECD, 2013; Oosterbeek et al., 2010). 
                                                 
2  Our definition of entrepreneurship education emphasizes the efficacy of formal education in nurturing 
entrepreneurial knowledge and motivation. It is therefore consistent with prior research on how taking 
entrepreneurship courses leads students to perceive entrepreneurship to be more feasible and/or desirable 
(Peterman and Kennedy, 2003; Sánchez, 2013). This self-perception is considered critical for start-up 
decisions (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006), but can deviate from educational attainment, which is a form of 
social perception. 
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Second, our results contribute to the literature on institutions and entrepreneurship. Prior 
research in this field has illuminated how country-level institutions directly (e.g., Bowen and 
De Clercq, 2008; Lee et al., 2011) or interactively (e.g., Kim and Li, 2014) shape 
entrepreneurial activity. This study adds to this literature by providing evidence for the role of 
individual-level entrepreneurship education in this context. It also highlights that combining 
theory from different level of analysis can further our understanding of how entrepreneurship 
education and the institutional environment interact in promoting entrepreneurial activity. 
 
2. Theory development 
Institutional theory seeks to explain how and why countries differ in the way that 
economic activities are organized and undertaken (Whitley, 1999). Institutions—“the humanly 
devised constraints that structure human interaction” (North, 1990: 3)—define rules and 
norms, with which individuals and organizations tend to comply to sustain their positions and 
legitimacy (Bruton et al., 2010). Institutional theory has been acknowledged as a powerful 
perspective to examine various phenomena, including the cross-country variance in 
entrepreneurial activity (e.g., Bruton et al., 2010; Jennings et al., 2013; Minniti, 2008; Welter 
and Smallbone, 2011). Baumol (1990: 894) notes, “[h]ow the entrepreneur acts at a given 
time and place depends heavily on the rules of the game—the reward structure in the 
economy”. Institutions also play a key role in public policies intended to encourage more 
entrepreneurship within a country. The state designs and operates formal institutions, such as 
the legal system, and can indirectly influence informal institutions through its 
pronouncements and actions (Welter and Smallbone, 2011). As Minniti (2008) emphasizes, it 
is the influence on institutions what enables government policies to influence 
entrepreneurship. Indeed, the desire to promote innovation and reduce unemployment has led 
many countries to invest in an entrepreneurship-friendly institutional infrastructure in general 
(Minniti, 2008) and entrepreneurship education in particular (e.g., Brush et al., 2003; 
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EACEA, 2012; Katz, 2003). How both aspects affect entrepreneurial activity has been 
explored in two different, relatively isolated research streams.  
The first research stream, based on institutional theory (North, 1990; Whitley, 1999), 
focuses on how country-level institutions are conducive or unconducive to entrepreneurship. 
This effect of institutions is believed to operate via several mechanisms. For instance, 
institutions influence the transaction costs, risk, and uncertainty of entrepreneurial behavior 
(North, 1990; Mueller and Thomas, 2001). They define, create, and limit entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Baker et al., 2005; Urbano and Alvarez, 2014). They regulate the accumulation 
and appropriability of the returns from entrepreneurship and innovation (Autio and Acs, 2010; 
Levie and Autio, 2011). Empirical research has linked entrepreneurial activity to various 
institutions, such as state incentives (Meek et al., 2010), bankruptcy laws (Lee et al., 2011), 
the financial system (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008), the legal system (Lim et al., 2010), the 
educational system (De Clercq et al., 2013), property rights (McMullen et al., 2008), 
economic freedom (Gohmann, 2012), corruption control (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009), and a 
supportive infrastructure (Begley et al., 2005). While many of these studies imply that 
entrepreneurship-friendly institutions may directly stimulate entrepreneurial activity, a few 
studies argue that the opposite can also be true. Using an African country context, Frese et al. 
(2007) and Gielnik et al. (2015) motivate their research by proposing that weak institutions 
can lead to need-driven entrepreneurship activities. In a study by Kim and Li (2014), 
individuals were less likely to start a business in countries with a stronger rule of law. 
The second research stream explores how entrepreneurship education drives intended or 
actual career choices (Dickson et al., 2008; Gorman et al., 1997; Pittaway and Cope, 2007). 
This research focuses on the individual level. Entrepreneurship education can include extra-
curricular and curricular offerings that are either integrated into other subjects or constitute 
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separate subjects (EACEA, 2012; Huber et al., 2014).3 The literature has highlighted several 
advantages of entrepreneurship education. For instance, individuals learn to more effectively 
or rapidly bring business ideas to market than others, or at least feel more capable of doing so 
(Peterman and Kennedy, 2003). The existence of entrepreneurship education can signal the 
desirability of entrepreneurship and therefore sensitize students to entrepreneurial careers 
(Walter et al., 2013). In fact, most studies have indicated that taking entrepreneurship courses 
(e.g., Athayde, 2009; Peterman and Kennedy, 2003; Sánchez, 2013; Souitaris et al., 2007) or 
their mere existence (Walter et al., 2013; Walter and Dohse, 2012) shapes interest in 
entrepreneurial careers. Other studies suggest negative, discouraging effects, arguably 
because entrepreneurship students obtain a more realistic perspective on their own 
entrepreneurial abilities and preferences and the requirements of successful entrepreneurial 
careers (von Graevenitz et al., 2010; Oosterbeek et al., 2010). Recent meta-analyses find 
positive overall effects of entrepreneurship education on human capital assets and 
entrepreneurship outcomes (Bae et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2013). Yet, they report 
considerable heterogeneity in prior findings and interpret this as a sign of potential 
moderators. Because some of the differences appear to reflect institutional differences, 
institutional theory may be a promising starting point to identify such moderators at the 
country level (Bruton et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2008; Shepherd, 2011).4  
To guide our selection of institutional characteristics, we draw on Whitley’s (1999; 
2002) comparative business systems perspective. This framework has been advocated for 
                                                 
3  Extra-curricular offerings are often based on programs, such as BizWorld for primary schools (Huber et al., 
2014), Young Achievement Australia (Peterman and Kennedy, 2003) for secondary schools and EXIST 
(Kulicke, 2014) for universities. In the curricula of primary and secondary schools, entrepreneurship education 
tends to be integrated into other subjects but is also taught as a separate subject (EACEA, 2012). Many 
universities provide curricular entrepreneurship courses (Souitaris et al., 2007) or specialized MSc programs 
(Rauch and Hulsink, 2014). 
4  In the overview by Martin et al. (2013: 216), several published studies investigated the relationship between 
entrepreneurship education and entrepreneurial intentions. For countries with entrepreneurship-hostile 
institutions, including Poland, South Africa and Tanzania, the relationship was homogenously positive (also 
cf. Gielnik et al., 2015), whereas it was partly positive, partly negative in countries characterized by 
entrepreneurship-friendly institutions, including Australia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and Spain. 
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considering a comprehensive set of institutions and for offering a clear link between a 
country’s institutional profile and entrepreneurial activity (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Lim 
et al., 2010). Essentially, Whitley suggests four groups of institutional factors to explain the 
organization of economic activity within a country: (1) the state, e.g., the extent of formal 
market regulations, (2) the financial system, e.g., the process by which capital is made 
available and priced, (3) the skill development and control system, e.g., the education and 
training system, and (4) norms and values governing trust and authority relationships. Using 
Whitley’s framework, we formulate hypotheses for the contingent effect of five institutions, 
namely entrepreneur-friendly regulations, financial capital availability, educational capital 
availability, control of corruption, and the public image of entrepreneurs. 
According to the theory of entrepreneurial action (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006), the 
decision to exploit an entrepreneurial opportunity is determined by an individual’s beliefs 
regarding whether she can achieve the expected outcomes with that opportunity and whether 
this attainment fulfills the individual’s original motive. In other words, entrepreneurial 
activity results from a belief that successfully exploiting a given opportunity is both feasible 
and desirable.5 Education can play a central role in this context. As McMullen and Shepherd 
(2006: 141) note, “[…] through learning efforts and/or the encouragement of others, one may 
be able to overcome doubt and act [on a given opportunity]”. Similarly, prior research has 
revealed that entrepreneurship courses make the participants perceive entrepreneurial activity 
to be more feasible and/or more desirable (Athayde, 2009; Souitaris et al., 2007). 
Entrepreneurship education is believed to raise interest in entrepreneurial careers by 
transferring basic entrepreneurial knowledge and motivation (Huber et al., 2014; Peterman 
and Kennedy, 2003; Sánchez, 2013), by shaping critical aspects of an individual’s 
occupational self-concept (Armstrong and Crombie, 2000), and by boosting post-school 
entrepreneurial learning (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Huber et al., 2014). 
                                                 
5  Our theorizing focuses on the ‘evaluation stage’ of McMullen and Shepherd’s (2006) model as this stage 
directly portrays the decision to engage in entrepreneurial action.  
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Two theoretical mechanisms can explain why institutions condition the impact of 
entrepreneurship education.6 First, the relative importance of entrepreneurship education 
varies across institutional environments. It is more critical in entrepreneurship-hostile 
institutional environments, where institutional barriers to start-up activity are higher and 
alternatives to entrepreneurship education are not readily available elsewhere.7 Second, 
institutions influence the relative utility, i.e., the monetary and non-monetary pay-offs that an 
individual can derive from pursuing an entrepreneurial career vis-à-vis alternative careers 
(Baker et al., 2005; Douglas and Shepherd, 2002; Eisenhauer, 1995; Lévesque et al., 2002). In 
countries with underdeveloped institutions, entrepreneurship is often the utility-maximizing 
option (e.g., necessity entrepreneurship in Africa, Gielnik et al., 2015). These two 
mechanisms form the basis of our five hypotheses below. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
One important aspect of the institutional environment is the legal system in general and 
entrepreneur-friendly regulations in particular. The latter refers to legal provisions supportive 
of entrepreneurial activity, including start-up regulations (Stel et al., 2007), bankruptcy 
regulations (Lee et al., 2011), and intellectual property rights (McMullen et al., 2008). A 
strong legal system increases efficiency in business transactions and reduces transaction costs, 
thereby enabling individuals to profit from their business activities (Meek et al., 2010; 
Whitley, 1999). Enforceable property rights and efficient legal procedures to establish and 
dissolve a firm are conducive to start-up activity because they increase the value appropriable 
from an entrepreneurial opportunity (Baker et al., 2005). In contrast, unfavorable regulations 
are said to hamper entrepreneurial activity (Aidis et al., 2008). For instance, effective property 
                                                 
6  Another possibility is that the general knowledge provided by entrepreneurship education is more suitable for 
the typical start-up activity in entrepreneurship-hostile than in entrepreneurship-friendly institutional 
environments. 
7  One example of how entrepreneurship education can operate under ‘difficult conditions’, namely in prison, is 
provided by Patzelt et al. (2014). 
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rights facilitate the formulation of a strategy to appropriate and protect value through an 
entrepreneurial opportunity—a task that is less straightforward in countries with insufficient 
legal property protection.  
The effect of entrepreneurship education on entrepreneurial activity should be stronger 
in countries with entrepreneur-hostile regulations. In this environment, more persistence and 
know-how is needed to start a venture. Entrepreneurship education can lead individuals to 
perceive entrepreneurial activity as more feasible (Peterman and Kennedy, 2003; Sánchez, 
2013). The better an individual feels equipped with entrepreneurial knowledge and motivation 
from entrepreneurship education, the more likely she has the confidence to overcome 
regulation-related barriers. Conversely, in countries with entrepreneur-friendly regulations, 
these barriers are lower. This facilitates entry into entrepreneurship also for individuals with 
no or low-quality entrepreneurship education, which, in turn, decreases the relationship 
between an individual’s perceptions of entrepreneurship education and entrepreneurial 
activity. 
Furthermore, a sound legal framework also supports the sustained economic growth of 
incumbents (North, 1990; Whitley, 2002). For instance, firms were found to be, on average, 
larger in countries where patents effectively safeguard property rights (Bowen and De Clercq, 
2008; Kumar et al., 1999). If incumbents prosper in such environments, higher and more 
certain income and better social safety can be attained through wage-employment (Baker et 
al., 2005). In contrast, wage-employment is typically less well paid or unavailable in countries 
with entrepreneur-hostile regulations, making entrepreneurship an attractive alternative for 
someone who has acquired entrepreneurial motivation and knowledge through education 
(McMullen et al., 2008). In addition, many companies in Western countries, in particular 
those countries with entrepreneur-friendly regulations, have adopted corporate venturing 
practices to compete in the market for innovation (Covin and Miles, 2007). Entrepreneurs and 
‘intrapreneurs’ are said to have great overlaps in their motivational profiles, sharing for 
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instance a desire for independence (Kuratko et al., 2011:230-231). In other words, incumbents 
in these countries are more likely to offer jobs that satisfy many psychological needs of 
entrepreneurs, with a more certain income than entrepreneurship. Thus, in countries with 
entrepreneur-friendly regulations, some entrepreneurial potential created by entrepreneurship 
education is likely to flow to incumbents rather than resulting in start-up activity. Ceteris 
paribus, the effect of entrepreneurship education on entrepreneurial activity may become 
stronger, the lower the level of entrepreneur-friendly regulations: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Entrepreneur-friendly regulations negatively moderate the positive relationship 
between entrepreneurship education and entrepreneurial activity.  
 
Institutional environments vary in the extent to which they supply resources supportive 
of business activities. In some environments, abundant resources are available and enable 
newly created firms lacking slack resources to pursue resource-intensive strategies—a 
situation referred to as ‘environmental munificence’ (Begley et al., 2005; Rosenbusch et al., 
2013).8 We focus on two aspects of environmental munificence derived from Whitley’s 
(1999) framework. The first aspect is financial capital availability, i.e., the degree to which 
entrepreneurs can access financial capital via bank loans, venture capitalists or the stock 
market (De Clercq et al., 2013). Access to external funding is critical for potential 
entrepreneurs to overcome personal liquidity constraints (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). The 
second aspect is educational capital availability, i.e., the supply of skilled labor as reflected in 
the average educational level in a country (Lim et al., 2010). This aspect emphasizes general 
education, which has to be distinguished from specialized education that shapes specific 
mindsets and skills, such as entrepreneurship education (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008). Access 
to abundant financial resources and to high-quality human resources promotes founding 
                                                 
8  We thank an anonymous reviewer for directing us to the munificence argument. 
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decisions (Baker et al., 2005; De Clercq et al., 2013) and entrepreneurial performance (Millán 
et al., 2014). 
We argue next that the link between entrepreneurship education and entrepreneurial 
activity is stronger in low-munificence countries. If acquiring key resources is impossible or 
only at high costs, exploiting a given entrepreneurial opportunity may appear less feasible 
(McMullen and Shepherd, 2006). The lower the environmental munificence in a country, the 
more critical the role of entrepreneurship education for feasibility perceptions becomes 
(Huber et al., 2014; Peterman and Kennedy, 2003; Sánchez, 2013). Similarly, demonstrating 
one’s competence through education, including entrepreneurship education, becomes more 
important in a country where competition for resources prevails (Unger et al., 2011). In 
contrast, in high-munificence countries, resource competition and thus the salience of 
entrepreneurship education decline, enabling also individuals with lacking or low-quality 
entrepreneurship education to enter entrepreneurship. 
Environmental munificence may also affect the relative utility individuals gain from 
entrepreneurial activity vis-à-vis wage-employment. Meta-analytical research suggests that 
many existing firms respond to a munificent environment by being more entrepreneurially 
oriented and thus perform better (Rosenbusch et al., 2013). These firms are not only likely to 
pay higher wages compared with potential income from entrepreneurship, but they are also 
likely to offer intrapreneurship-like jobs that are interesting for entrepreneurial-minded 
individuals (Kuratko et al., 2011:230-231). Incumbents may therefore be attractive employers 
for individuals whose entrepreneurship education led them to value entrepreneurial careers 
more. However, in low-munificence countries, in which financial and educational capital are 
scarce, the same type of individuals may derive greater utility from entrepreneurial activity 
because entrepreneurial-oriented incumbents and thus offers of intrapreneurship-like jobs are 
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less frequent.9 Thus, ceteris paribus, the effect of entrepreneurship education on 
entrepreneurial activity may become stronger, the lower the level of financial and educational 
capital availability in a country: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Financial capital availability negatively moderates the positive relationship 
between entrepreneurship education and entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Educational capital availability negatively moderates the positive relationship 
between entrepreneurship education and entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Another critical aspect of institutions is control of corruption, i.e., the degree to which 
corruption—the abuse of public power for private gains, for instance through bribery—is 
constrained (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Lim et al., 2010). Corruption increases agency and 
transaction costs and thereby creates disincentives for investing into activities with uncertain 
or temporally distant payoffs, such as innovation and entrepreneurship (Anokhin and Schulze, 
2009). Prior research has found that higher levels of corruption are associated not only with 
lower national welfare (Ehrlich and Lui, 1999), but also with lower firm growth and 
performance (Petrou, 2014). Since corruption poses additional risks and costs, incumbents in 
corruption-plagued countries are less willing and/or able to pay high wages and engage in 
corporate entrepreneurship. Intrapreneurship-like jobs are less likely to exist in these countries 
and entrepreneurship education leads individuals to become entrepreneurs rather than 
intrapreneurs.  
                                                 
9  Entrepreneurship education could also enable individuals to effectively choose between alternative resources 
(e.g., bank loans vs. venture capital), thereby raising the potential value of a given opportunity. Moreover, if 
high-quality human resources are unavailable, a potential entrepreneur might refuse to pursue entrepreneurial 
opportunities despite entrepreneurship education. Both arguments suggest positive moderation effects of 
financial and education capital availability. 
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In addition, corruption discourages entrepreneurship in a country to the extent to which 
corrupt officials misappropriate value from an entrepreneurial opportunity (Bowen and De 
Clercq, 2008). In the face of corruption, exploiting an opportunity may appear less feasible 
and/or less desirable (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). However, an individual who have learned 
through entrepreneurship education that start-up barriers can be overcome is more likely to 
positively evaluate an opportunity despite corruption (Peterman and Kennedy, 2003; Sánchez, 
2013). Individuals may also be more determined to exploit opportunities despite corruption, if 
entrepreneurship education has led them to integrate aspects of entrepreneurship into their 
occupational self-concept (Armstrong and Crombie, 2000). Conversely, in countries 
effectively controlling corruption, start-up barriers are lower and these advantages of 
entrepreneurship education are thus less salient. Ceteris paribus, the effect of entrepreneurship 
education on entrepreneurial activity may become stronger, the lower the control of 
corruption in a country: 
 
Hypothesis 4. Control of corruption negatively moderates the positive relationship between 
entrepreneurship education and entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Institutions can legitimize or delegitimize economic activity (North, 1990; Whitley, 
1999). By defining social norms and values, they specify desired behaviors and sanctions for 
non-compliance (Meek et al., 2010). While entrepreneurship is a generally accepted and 
appreciated behavior in some countries, entrepreneurs face greater suspicion in other 
countries (Busenitz et al., 2000; Urbano and Alvarez, 2014). We therefore suggest the public 
image of entrepreneurs, i.e., the share of persons with a favorable opinion of entrepreneurs 
within a country, as a final boundary condition for the effect of entrepreneurship education. In 
countries that value entrepreneurial activity, an individual is exposed to entrepreneurship-
friendly attitudes also outside school or university boundaries (Walter and Dohse, 2012). This 
 14 
can inspire her to embark on entrepreneurial endeavors without adequate entrepreneurship 
education. Here, the societal environment serves as an alternative source of image-driven 
motivation to engage in entrepreneurial behavior. This is less likely in countries, in which 
skepticism towards entrepreneurship prevails and makes entrepreneurship education a more 
critical source of entrepreneurial motivation. For instance, Souitaris et al. (2007) found that 
taking entrepreneurship courses can shape subjective norms. 
Further, anti-entrepreneurial attitudes in a country complicate entrepreneurial activity, 
and hence individuals require better education to perceive and derive utility from it. If the 
public image of entrepreneurs in a country is negatively biased, the utility arising from 
entrepreneurial activity may often be underestimated and underrated (Anokhin and Schulze, 
2009). Entrepreneurship education sheds a more realistic light on entrepreneurship, in terms 
of potential income, risks, and working conditions (Oosterbeek et al., 2010). This can lead an 
individual to appreciate an entrepreneurial career more and to believe more in her ability to 
overcome barriers, such as those resulting from the public’s reservations concerning 
entrepreneurship. Thus, ceteris paribus, the effect of entrepreneurship education on 
entrepreneurial activity may become stronger, the more negative the public image of 
entrepreneurs in a country: 
 
Hypothesis 5. The public image of entrepreneurs negatively moderates the positive 
relationship between entrepreneurship education and entrepreneurial activity. 
 
4. Methods 
4.1 Sample and data sources 
Individual-level data came from the Flash Eurobarometer (EB) Survey on 
Entrepreneurship No. 283 (cf. Block et al., 2013). The survey is representative of the general 
population (in China: urban population) aged 15 years and above (Gallup Organization, 2010) 
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and covers 36 countries: 27 EU states, five other European countries (Croatia, Iceland, 
Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey) and China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. A 
total of 26,168 respondents aged 15 years and older were interviewed, primarily via phone, 
between December 2009 and January 2010. In nine countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia), the interviews were 
conducted face-to-face, accounting for approximately 30% of the total number of interviews. 
The target sample size was 1,000 respondents in 16 countries (Belgium, China, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Greece, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
South Korea, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 500 respondents in the 
remaining countries.  
Of the 26,168 respondents, 12,236 were of working age (15 to 65 years old) and either 
self- or wage-employed at the time of the survey. We excluded four countries (Malta, 
Portugal, Slovakia, and Turkey, altogether 1006 cases), for which ‘entrepreneurship 
education’ showed weak measurement model fit (as explained below). This led to our final 
sample of 11,230 individuals from 32 countries. The average respondent was 44 years old (sd 
= 10.96) and has finished full-time education at the age of 20 (sd = 3.23). Our sample profile 
is similar to that of the widely used Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (e.g., Aidis et al., 2008; 
Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; McMullen et al., 2008; Urbano and Alvarez, 2014).10  
Country-level data came from various, commonly-accepted sources, including the 
Educational Attainment Dataset (Barro and Lee, 2013), the Doing Business Database (World 
Bank, 2011a), the Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, 2010), the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook (Institute for Management Development, 2011), and the World 
Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2011b). To avoid bias due to extreme observations, e.g., 
                                                 
10 Applying our sampling criteria, the two datasets had 24 countries in common. These samples were similar 
regarding self-employment (Flash EB: 20%, GEM: 17%) and age (Flash EB: mean = 43.97, sd = 11.01; GEM: 
mean = 42.62, sd = 10.92) but differed regarding the share of male respondents (Flash EB: 48% male, GEM: 
59% male).  
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recession periods, we used a 7-year average (2004-2010) where possible. Table 1 summarizes 
key characteristics of our sample. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
4.2 Measures 
4.2.1 Dependent variable  
The Flash EB survey operationalized entrepreneurial activity through one question: “As 
far as your current occupation is concerned, would you say you are self-employed, in paid 
employment or would you say you are without a professional activity?” Three response 
categories were possible, including “self-employed” (e.g., architects and owner-managers of a 
company), “in paid employment”, and “without a professional activity” (i.e., students, retired 
individuals, and the unemployed). Given the focus of our study, we excluded observations 
from the latter category from our analysis. Responses were coded 1 for entrepreneurial 
activity, i.e., being self-employed, and 0 for being wage-employed at the time of the survey.  
 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
Entrepreneurship education was measured with four items on a 4-point Likert-Scale (1 
= “strongly agree”, 4 = “strongly disagree”; reversed scale): “My school education helped me 
develop my sense of initiative—a sort of entrepreneurial attitude”, “My school education 
helped me to better understand the role of entrepreneurs in society.”, “My school education 
made me interested to become an entrepreneur”, and “My school education gave me skills and 
know-how that enable me to run a business” (α = 0.81). This measure furthers our study by 
highlighting the extent to which entrepreneurship education has led individuals to generally 
perceive entrepreneurial activity to be more desirable and feasible—aspects that are central to 
the model of entrepreneurial action. In comparison, previous studies have adopted a more 
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disaggregated view: They measured participation in entrepreneurship courses or the extent to 
which such courses are offered in curricula and then hypothesized that this should enhance 
perceptions of desirability, feasibility, or related constructs (e.g., Souitaris et al., 2007; Walter 
and Dohse, 2012).  
Having a multiple-item construct allowed us to test for measurement invariance. 
Although this practice is not widespread, failure to establish measurement equivalence in 
cross-country research can induce measurement error, bias estimators and reduce the power of 
statistical tests (Diamantopoulos and Papadopoulos, 2010). We began testing measurement 
model fit through country-wise confirmatory factor analyses. Four countries, Malta, Portugal, 
Slovakia, and Turkey, presented insufficient fit (GFIs < 0.80) and were thus excluded from 
further analyses. However, robustness checks confirmed that our main findings are stable to 
including these countries. We then tested for measurement invariance as recommended by 
Vandenberg and Lance (2000; Table 2). The covariance matrices were not equal across 
countries and thus some form of measurement inequivalence exists (Test 1). However, the a 
priori pattern of free and fixed loadings imposed on the items was invariant across countries 
(Test 2, configural invariance), and the factor loadings of like items were equal across 
countries (Test 3, metric invariance). The final test indicated that the vector of item intercepts 
varied across countries and could therefore not confirm scalar invariance. As Vandenberg and 
Lance (2000) note, this does not necessarily suggest bias, but is often caused by the context of 
a study.11 In our case, differences in intercepts may reflect country differences in the extent to 
which entrepreneurship education is emphasized (EACEA, 2012) and considered good 
preparation for the country-typical form of entrepreneurship. Moreover, after freeing Items 1 
and 4, at least partial scalar invariance was confirmed. Overall, our findings of configural, 
                                                 
11 Vandenberg and Lance (2000: 38) note, “intercept differences may not reflect biases (undesirable) but 
response threshold differences that might be predicted based on known group differences (desirable), for 
example, between inexperienced versus highly experienced employees. Thus, whether this invariance test 
should be undertaken depends greatly on the substantive context underlying the study.” 
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metric, and partial scalar invariance strengthen our belief that measurement inequality does 
not distort our analysis.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Institutional variables were constructed, unless stated otherwise, as an average over the 
years 2004 to 2010. Entrepreneur-friendly regulations were measured by a composite of three 
different aspects. The first aspect, start-up regulations, i.e., legal provisions allowing one to 
start a business in a quick and cost-efficient manner (Stel et al., 2007), was captured by three 
standardized items taken from the Doing Business Database (World Bank, 2011a). The 
respective items reflect the regulatory burden associated with starting a business, including (1) 
the number of procedures, i.e., interactions with external parties such as government agencies, 
(2) the number of calendar days, as evaluated by incorporation lawyers, and (3) the costs, 
such as fees and notary charges, as a percentage of per capita income necessary to obtain legal 
status. Since we are interested in ‘entrepreneur-friendly’ regulations, the signs of the items 
were inverted (α = 0.79). The second aspect is bankruptcy regulations, i.e., legal provisions 
allowing one to file bankruptcy in a quick and cost-efficient manner. Similar to Lee et al. 
(2011), our measure comprises three standardized items from the Doing Business Database, 
including (1) the time in calendar years required to recover debt, (2) costs as a percentage of 
the debtor’s estate value to recover debt, and (3) the recovery rate, in cents on the dollar, 
available to creditors through reorganization, liquidation or debt enforcement. Items 1 and 2 
received negative signs to reflect entrepreneur-friendly regulations (α = 0.79). The final aspect 
was intellectual property rights, i.e., the degree to which rights to intellectual property are 
granted and enforced, for which we used a measure provided by the World Competitiveness 
Yearbook (Institute for Management Development, 2011). A sample of executives 
(representative of the economic sectors in a country, namely, primary, manufacturing, and 
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services) rated the degree to which intellectual property rights are adequately enforced in their 
country (10-point Likert-scale, 0 = “are not adequately enforced”, 10 = “are adequately 
enforced”). The three aspects were standardized and summed to yield our final measure of 
entrepreneur-friendly regulations. 
Financial capital availability was measured using data provided by the Global 
Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, 2010), in particular three items that are 
also employed by De Clerq et al. (2013). On average, 100 experts per country evaluated the 
ease of obtaining funding in their country (7-point Likert-scale, 1 = “very difficult”, 7 = “very 
easy”). This includes access to the stock market (“How easy is it to raise money by issuing 
shares on the stock market in your country?”), access to venture capital (“In your country, 
how easy is it for entrepreneurs with innovative but risky projects to find venture capital?”), 
and access to bank loans (“How easy is it to obtain a bank loan in your country with only a 
good business plan and no collateral?”; α = 0.91). Similar to Lim et al. (2010), we measured 
educational capital availability as the average years of schooling for the total population, as 
provided by the Educational Attainment Dataset (Barro and Lee, 2013).  
Our measure for control of corruption is one of the six widely used World Governance 
Indicators (World Bank, 2011b). The particular indicator used in our study has the widest 
coverage of all corruption indices (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009) and reflects perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption. The measure gathers various information, such as respondents’ 
perception of the level of “unofficial payments to public officials” and corruption by elected 
leaders. It reflects the perceived quality of governance, in terms of addressing corruption, and 
ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak governance) to 2.5 (strong governance). Finally, the 
Flash Eurobarometer No 208 contains one question concerning the public image of 
entrepreneurs (“What is your opinion about the following groups of persons?”; 3-point 
Likert-scale, 1 = “rather favorable”, 3 = “rather unfavorable”). To construct our measure, we 
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calculated the share of persons in a country with a favorable opinion of entrepreneurs, with a 
low of 0.29 in Hungary and a high of 0.86 in Iceland. This aggregation was based on the 
complete dataset of 26,168 respondents, not only our subset of 11,230 self- and wage-
employed respondents. 
 
4.2.3 Control variables 
To isolate the effect of our independent variables, various control variables were 
included in our regressions. At the individual level, we controlled for the age of the 
respondent because the opportunity costs of entrepreneurship increase with age (Lévesque and 
Minniti, 2006), making older individuals less likely to engage in entrepreneurial activity. Men 
were found to start new ventures more often than women (Brush, 1992). Gender effects were 
captured with a dummy variable for being male (1 = male, 0 = female). Investments in human 
capital can enhance the payoffs from entrepreneurship (Unger et al., 2011). We therefore 
controlled for the respondent’s education level, i.e., the age when finishing full-time 
education minus the usual age of starting education, namely six years. Self-employed kin can 
serve as role models (Scherer et al., 1989) and a source of entrepreneurial know-how (Tervo, 
2006). We included two separate dummy variables for having a self-employed father and/or a 
self-employed mother (1 = self-employed, 0 = otherwise). 
Various personality traits were found to promote entrepreneurial activity (Rauch and 
Frese, 2007). Entrepreneurs are believed to accept more risks than others as they are 
confronted with less structured and more uncertain problems and bear the ultimate 
responsibility for their decisions (Stewart Jr. and Roth, 2001). Risk tolerance was captured 
with the item “In general, I am willing to take risks” on—as is the case for the subsequent 
variables—a 4-point Likert-scale (1 = “strongly agree” to 4 = “strongly disagree”; scale 
reversed). To persevere in the face of uncertainty, entrepreneurs need high self-confidence 
(Wilson et al., 2007), which was measured by the item “Generally, when facing difficult 
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tasks, I am certain that I will accomplish them”. Feeling able to control outcomes can give 
individuals the necessary drive to successfully start a new venture. Internal locus of control 
was measured with the item “My life is determined by my own action, not by others or by 
chance”. Creativity facilitates the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities (Lee and Wong, 
2004), which is a prerequisite for entrepreneurship. Inventiveness was measured with the item 
“I am an inventive person who has ideas”. Achievement-oriented individuals prefer 
entrepreneurial careers as they permit direct feedback on own performance (Collins et al., 
2004). This was considered with one item for the desire for competition (“I like situations in 
which I compete with others”). Proactivity facilitates the perception of opportunities and 
acting on them (Crant, 1996). It was measured with the item “If I see something I do not like, 
I change it”. Optimism leads individuals to view the challenges of entrepreneurship more 
positively (Rauch and Frese, 2007) and was captured through the item “I am optimistic about 
my future”. At the country level, we controlled for differences in national wealth in terms of 
GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (international dollars) averaged over the years 




4.3.1 Hierarchical linear modeling  
Traditional methods to analyze nested data pose threats of aggregation or disaggregation 
bias. We thus employed hierarchical linear modeling (HLM; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002) 
with restricted maximum likelihood estimates to test our cross-level hypotheses. HLM 
examines each variable at its natural level and considers partial interdependence between 
individuals in the same country. HLM tends to provide parameter estimates similar to those of 
an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, but mitigates the deflation in standard errors 
associated with OLS for nested data. Since our hypotheses postulated moderating effects of 
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country-level variables (institutions) on individual-level relationships (entrepreneurship 
education and entrepreneurial activity), we employed slopes-as-outcomes models. We mean-
centered metric predictors to make the intercept more interpretable. However, we obtained the 
same pattern of results when using raw data. Specifically, we accounted for the Bernoulli 
distribution of our dependent variable by using hierarchical generalized linear models 
(HGLM). Similar to normal logistic regression, the individual-level estimates do not refer to 
levels of the dependent variable but to the natural logarithm of the likelihood (log-odds) that 
the dependent variable will take a value of 1 denoting being self-employed rather than a value 
of 0 denoting being wage-employed. However, the country-level estimates are interpreted 
similarly to those obtained from linear regressions because the intercepts and slopes from the 
individual-level model are continuous and normally distributed.  
 
4.3.2 Common method bias 
Collecting data for the dependent and independent variables from the same source can 
lead to common method bias. While combining survey data with archival data mitigates this 
risk (Podsakoff et al., 2003), we also conducted several ex-post tests for such a bias. First, we 
applied Harman’s one-factor test on all observed indicators. For no country did a single factor 
emerge that accounted for the majority of covariance between the indicators. Second, using 
the CFA marker technique (Williams et al., 2010)—to date, the most advanced ex-post 
statistical control strategy (Richardson et al., 2009)—we attempted to identify the existence 
and extent of common method effects by comparing a baseline model with three other 
models: The ‘Method-C model’ assumes equal method effects, the ‘Method-U model’ 
assumes unequal methods effects, and the ‘Method-R model’ is identical to the Method-C and 
U models, except that it constrains the factor correlations to the values from the baseline 
model. A measure of attitudes toward civil servants (3-point Likert-scale; 1 = “rather 
favorable”, 3 = “rather unfavorable”) served as our theoretically unrelated marker variable. In 
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26 countries, method factor loadings (assumed to be equal) were not significantly related to 
substantive indicators (Baseline vs. Method-C models, Δχ2 < 3.59, Δdf = 1, ns). For 13 
countries, the tests suggested that the marker variable had an unequal impact on the 
substantive indicators (Method-C vs. Method-U models, Δχ2 > 19.68, Δdf = 11, p < .05). 
However, further tests indicated that the equal or unequal effects of the marker variable did 
not significantly bias the estimates of substantive factor correlations (Method-C vs. Method-R 
models, Δχ2 < 15.81, Δdf = 25, ns; Method-U vs. Method-R models, Δχ2 < 4.92, Δdf = 36, ns). 
According to these tests, common method bias did not pose a serious threat to the validity of 
our main results. 
 
4.3.3 Endogeneity 
Perceptions of entrepreneurship education drive, as we argue, entrepreneurial activity 
but also a reverse logic is possible: entrepreneurial activity influences perceptions of 
entrepreneurship education, for instance due to ex-post rationalization or socially desirable 
answers by the respondents. Simultaneous causality is one source of endogeneity that can lead 
to biased and inconsistent coefficients. Two-stage instrumental variables regression can 
mitigate endogeneity-related bias but at the cost of producing much larger standard errors than 
standard regression. It is therefore recommendable, even if a variable appears theoretically 
endogenous, not to model it as endogenous until tests confirm that endogeneity is a statistical 
problem (Wooldridge, 2003). Two instrument variables, namely (1) opinions concerning top-
managers in large production companies and (2) opinions concerning managers in a bank or a 
similar institution, were significantly correlated with the potentially endogenous variable 
(entrepreneurship education), but not with the dependent variable (entrepreneurial activity), 
and were significantly related to entrepreneurship education in the first-stage regression. Tests 
suggested that the instruments were relevant (F = 60.72, p < .001; Staiger and Stock, 1997) 
and exogenous (Amemiya-Lee-Newey statistic = .09, ns). Using these instruments, we find 
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that endogeneity does not pose a serious problem: Both a Wald test on exogeneity (X2 = .01, 
ns) and a weak-instrument robust test (Anderson-Rubin statistic: X2 = .37, ns) could not reject 
the null hypothesis that entrepreneurship education is exogenous. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Main results 
Table 3 depicts the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Table 4 describes the 
regression results. Computations of the condition index (CI) and variance inflation factor 
(VIF) indicate no serious multicollinearity problems (CI < 3.13, VIF < 2.24). The models 
explained between 11.08% (Model 1) and 14.39% (Model 10) of the variation in 
entrepreneurial activity (Snijders and Bosker, 1999: 255-257).12 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Our five hypotheses posited that the positive relationship between entrepreneurship 
education and entrepreneurial activity is negatively moderated by country-level institutions, or 
in other words, that the relationship is stronger in entrepreneurship-hostile institutional 
environments than in entrepreneurship-friendly environments. The regression results support 
Hypothesis 1 regarding entrepreneur-friendly regulations (Model 4: b = -.04, p < .01), 
Hypothesis 2 regarding financial capital availability (Model 6: b = -.14, p < .05), Hypothesis 4 
regarding control of corruption (Model 10: b = -.11, p < .05), and Hypothesis 5 regarding the 
public image of entrepreneurs (Model 12: b = -.53, p < .01). However, we found no support 
for Hypothesis 3 regarding educational capital availability (Model 8: b = .01, ns) 
                                                 
12 Many authors employing HLM are cautious to avoid overburdening models and creating artifacts (e.g., Cullen 
et al., 2014; De Clercq et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2007). Similarly, we tested cross-level interactions one at a 
time rather than in a full model because our institutional variables were highly correlated and the degrees of 
freedom at country level relatively small (12 country-level variables and 32 countries). 
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Since the sign and magnitude of interactions can vary across observations in non-linear 
regressions, the estimated coefficient alone is insufficient to draw conclusions regarding an 
interaction’s sign and significance (Hoetker, 2007). We therefore graphed the interaction 
effects according to a procedure developed by Norton et al. (2004; implemented in STATA’s 
‘inteff’ command). The procedure considers that in non-linear regressions the interaction 
effect is a function of the interaction coefficient and—unlike in OLS regression—of the 
coefficient of each interacted variable and of the values of all covariates (Hoetker, 2007). 
Inspection of the plots (available from the first author) suggested that the four moderating 
effects were negative and significant almost over the whole range of predicted values for 
entrepreneurial activity. For ease of presentation, Figure 1 displays simplified plots according 
to Jaccard (2001). The graphs involve computing four point estimates of the probability of 
entrepreneurial activity using the means of the covariates and four combinations of high and 
low entrepreneurship education and the respective institutional variable (mean +/- one 
standard deviation). Overall, the plots further support Hypotheses 1, 2, 4, and 5. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Fig. 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
5.2 Additional analyses 
We conducted several robustness checks. These findings are omitted here for space 
reasons but are available from the first author. First, additional influences at the country level, 
including the age structure of the population, business friendliness, democracy before 1960, 
emerging economies, former Eastern Bloc country, immigrant share, taxation, service 
orientation, and unemployment rate can explain country differences in entrepreneurial activity 
(De Clercq et al., 2013, Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Lee et al., 2011). However, adding these 
control variables to our models one after another did not change the pattern of our main 
findings. Second, the literature has suggested culture as an important aspect of a cross-
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national understanding of entrepreneurship (e.g., Hayton and Cacciotti, 2013). In an approach 
similar to Cullen et al. (2014), we reran our regressions testing cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 
1980; House et al., 2004) as moderators, one at a time. Only institutional collectivism (values) 
had a significant positive moderating effect on outcomes of entrepreneurship education. 
Moreover, our main results were stable to controlling for cultural dimensions.13 Third, we 
reran our regressions with country-level variables based on data long before 2004, including 
control of corruption (1996-2010), immigrant share and service orientation (1960-2010). The 
findings based on the long-term variants of the variables did not differ significantly from our 
original results. Fourth, we aggregated our institutional variables into one composite measure 
that significantly and negatively moderated the relationship between entrepreneurship 
education and entrepreneurial activity. Fifth, our original results remained virtually 
unchanged when controlling for entrepreneurship experience. Sixth, our findings were also 
robust to expanding the sample to previously self- and wage-employed individuals who were 
without professional activity at the time of the survey. Seventh, one item of entrepreneurship 
(“My school education made me interested to become an entrepreneur”) could be tautological 
to entrepreneurial activity. Our results remain virtually unchanged when removing this item. 
Finally, we added 1,088 unemployed respondents to the sample and estimated hierarchical 
multinomial logistic models. The findings confirm our original results. 
 
6. Discussion and implications 
Many countries have allocated considerable resources to establish entrepreneurship 
education at universities, high schools, and primary schools. However, empirical evidence on 
the returns on these investments, in terms of creating interest in an entrepreneurial career and 
thus more entrepreneurial activity, has been mixed. From a practical perspective, this is a 
problematic situation for policy-makers and educators, who face increasing expectations to 
                                                 
13 Correlations of our institutional variables with cultural dimensions (practices) ranged from r = -.53 for power 
distance and financial capital availability to r = .40 for uncertainty avoidance and control of corruption. 
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justify educational investments and to rank educational outcomes internationally. From a 
theoretical perspective, the mixed findings can reflect what scholars have long proposed, 
namely that entrepreneurship is triggered by a person-context interaction (e.g., Learned, 1992) 
and that moderating influences might explain some of the variance in prior findings (e.g., Bae 
et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2013). Our study furthers research on contextual contingencies of 
entrepreneurship education by arguing that a country’s institutional environment matters for 
the outcomes of entrepreneurship education. Specifically, we posit that entrepreneurship 
education is more effective, in terms of stimulating more entrepreneurial activity, in 
entrepreneurship-hostile institutional environments, thus in those countries low in 
entrepreneur-friendly regulations (Hypothesis 1), financial capital availability (Hypothesis 2), 
educational capital availability (Hypothesis 3), control of corruption (Hypothesis 4) and 
public image of entrepreneurs (Hypothesis 5). Our empirical results support these arguments 
in all but one case: The strength of the individual-level relationship between entrepreneurship 
education and entrepreneurial activity varied systematically with country-level institutional 
variables (except for educational capital availability), being stronger in countries with 
entrepreneurship-hostile institutions.  
Two findings warrant further discussion. First, our results could not confirm a 
significant moderating effect of educational capital availability (Hypothesis 3). One 
explanation could be that much of the entrepreneurial activity in countries with 
underdeveloped, entrepreneurship-hostile institutions is likely to be necessity driven 
(Reynolds et al., 2003: 20). Since this type of start-up tends to grow slowly, if at all, human 
resources are a less critical factor. For instance, Stel et al. (2007) report that rigid employment 
regulations are negatively related to the rate of opportunity-driven, but unrelated to necessity-
driven nascent entrepreneurship. Moreover, a countervailing effect could neutralize our 
hypothesized effect: If critical human resources are scarce, a potential entrepreneur might 
decide against engaging in entrepreneurial activity despite having had excellent 
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entrepreneurship education. Second, entrepreneur-friendly regulations and control of 
corruption were significantly negatively related to entrepreneurial activity, which is contrary 
to our expectations that they would create a context conducive to entrepreneurship. One 
potential explanation is that corruption might create entrepreneurial opportunities in some 
countries. Welter and Smallbone (2011) offer the example of management consultancy firms 
helping to obtain business licenses and permits in highly corrupt countries. Another 
explanation is that entrepreneur-friendly regulations and control of corruption are 
characteristics of well-developed countries, as indicated by their high correlation with GDP 
per capita, and that the rate of new firm entry tends to decline in well-developed countries, as 
indicated by the negative correlation between GDP per capita and entrepreneurial activity. 
 
6.1 Implications for research 
This study offers several implications for related research. First, our findings add to a 
broad stream of literature on the outcomes of entrepreneurship education. Prior research relied 
on single-country data to link entrepreneurship education to entrepreneurial intentions (e.g., 
Peterman and Kennedy, 2003; Walter et al., 2013). In particular quasi-experimental studies—
the dominant type of studies in the field—had to disregard contextual influences as a matter of 
design (e.g., Souitaris et al., 2007). However, meta-analyses on educational outcomes have 
led to speculation concerning the existence of moderating influences (Bae et al., 2014; Martin 
et al., 2013; Unger et al., 2011). Our study contributes to this line of research by adopting, 
theoretically and empirically, a cross-country, multilevel perspective to show that outcomes of 
entrepreneurship education are contingent on a country’s institutional environment. This 
complements prior research focusing on entrepreneurship-specific human capital (De Clercq 
et al., 2013) or the regional context (Walter and Dohse, 2012). Moreover, much prior work 
has explored effects directly after taking entrepreneurship courses, in particular possibly 
short-lived entrepreneurial intentions (e.g., Peterman and Kennedy, 2003; Souitaris et al., 
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2007). Our study emphasizes the long-lasting effects of entrepreneurship education by 
examining entrepreneurial activity. 
Second, theorizing on entrepreneurship education has typically focused on the 
individual level (e.g., Souitaris et al., 2007). However, understanding the value of such 
education may require considering multiple levels of analysis and including contextual 
influences. Following calls for more multilevel theory building in entrepreneurship research 
(Shepherd, 2011), our study combined logic from institutional theory at the macro level and 
the model of entrepreneurial action at the micro level. According to our theory, the 
institutional environment alters individual utility functions related to entrepreneurship and can 
substitute for entrepreneurship education as a source of entrepreneurial knowledge and 
inspiration. This has implications for studies on the outcomes of entrepreneurship education, 
with their focus on individual-level theory, such as the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 
1991) or Shapero’s model of the entrepreneurial event (Krueger et al., 2000). These theories 
propose behavioral intentions as the best indicator of actual entrepreneurial behavior 
(Armitage and Conner, 2001). Our study suggests that the intention-behavior link might be 
conditioned by the institutional context (cf. Schlaegel and Koenig, 2014). In other words, the 
‘conversion rate’ of entrepreneurship education, i.e., the share of entrepreneurship students 
subsequently becoming entrepreneurs, might be contingent on institutions. In 
entrepreneurship-hostile institutions, more students who are inspired and prepared by 
entrepreneurship education actually choose entrepreneurial careers, whereas in 
entrepreneurship-friendly institutions, they are more inclined to opt for entrepreneurship-
related occupations, e.g., working as an intrapreneur in an established firm.  
Finally, this article contributes to the growing literature on institutional theory and 
entrepreneurship. Recently, scholars have begun to adopt institutional theory to illuminate 
how a country’s institutional profile directly affects the allocation of entrepreneurial activity 
(e.g., Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Bowen and De Clercq, 2008). Some studies challenged the 
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notion that highly developed institutions such as strong legal protection are conducive to 
entrepreneurial activity (Kim and Li, 2014). Our study demonstrated the contingent role of 
institutions in the context of entrepreneurship education. This finding suggests (similar to De 
Clercq et al., 2013) that research should be extended to include both the direct and moderating 
effects of institutions in other contexts. Considering both possibilities not only promises fresh 
insights, but it may also help to better exploit the explanatory potential of institutional theory 
(North, 1990; Whitley, 1999). Moreover, institutional theory has acknowledged educational 
organizations as drivers of change that contribute to a country’s economic performance by 
creating and disseminating knowledge that can alter the institutional framework (North, 1990: 
79-80). Our results concerning the moderating effect of the public image of entrepreneurs 
support this notion: Individuals with a positive impression of their entrepreneurship education 
are more likely to become entrepreneurs in countries with a negative opinion towards 
entrepreneurs. This allows speculations that educational institutions such as schools or 
universities could generate an entrepreneurship-friendly climate even in relatively 
entrepreneurship-hostile environments and could thereby act as ‘change agents’ to create 
more entrepreneurship in a society.  
 
6.2 Practical implications 
Countries increasingly benchmark educational outcomes, as exemplified by the PISA 
studies (OECD, 2013). At least implicitly, many intention-based studies suggest the relative 
number of start-ups resulting from entrepreneurship education as an indicator of its quality. 
Our study cautions against using start-up numbers alone to compare entrepreneurship 
education quality across countries because these numbers are conditioned by the national 
institutional context and could thus be ‘biased’. Moreover, many entrepreneurship syllabi 
appear designed to suit needs of future entrepreneurs. However, our theory indicates that in 
entrepreneurship-friendly institutional environments, existing companies and organizations 
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absorb some extent of the entrepreneurial potential created at schools and universities. This 
suggests extending entrepreneurship syllabi by inclusion of topics such as corporate 
entrepreneurship or entrepreneurship support schemes. Finally, our finding that 
entrepreneurship education has a particularly strong effect in entrepreneurship-hostile 
environments serves as a motivation for policy-makers to promote entrepreneurship education 
in such countries. 
 
6.3 Limitations and further research 
This study is not without limitations that mark potential avenues for further research. 
First, the Flash Eurobarometer database lacks information on firm characteristics, such as 
industry, size, growth, and financial performance, which precluded considering firm 
heterogeneity in our analyses. Although we suspect that much entrepreneurship in 
entrepreneurship-hostile institutional environments consists of micro businesses, the data 
restrictions do not allow any conclusions on the economic relevance of the observed 
entrepreneurial activity. Future research could therefore explore how the interplay of 
entrepreneurship education and country-level institutional context shapes the success and 
evolution of start-ups (e.g., Estrin et al., 2013). For instance, positive moderation effects could 
be expected for financial capital availability, a key constraint on start-up growth (Carpenter 
and Petersen, 2002). Second, data limitations precluded more nuanced tests regarding serial 
and hybrid entrepreneurship. Third, our sample primarily comprises European countries, but 
also China, Japan, South Korea and the U.S., and hence our results are conditional and mostly 
generalizable to that national context. Since the database excluded many developing countries 
outside Europe, other samples are more suitable to examine how entrepreneurship education 
contributes to entrepreneurial activity in these countries. Fourth, the Flash Eurobarometer 
survey measured psychological traits with single items. Although single-item measures were 
found to have acceptable estimated reliability (Wanous and Reichers, 1996) and predictive 
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validity similar to multi-item measures (Bergkvist and Rossiter, 2007), the findings for these 
variables should be interpreted with caution.  
Fifth, data limitations precluded controlling for migration effects. Immigrants might 
face entry barriers to the labor market and adhere to a value system that differs from a 
country’s informal institutions. Some immigrants might have attended school and started their 
business in different countries. While our theory makes no assumptions regarding the origin 
of entrepreneurship education, this raises interesting questions for future research. For 
instance, to what extent is the content of entrepreneurship education country-specific? Is 
motivation and knowledge gained via such education, in particular at school, equally valuable 
in another country setting? Sixth, studying entrepreneurship education retrospectively might 
have left some potential for recall bias. To minimize this risk, we controlled for variables, 
such as the respondent’s age and education level, that can explain systematic variation in such 
bias across respondents (Cassar, 2014). Moreover, additional analyses suggested that the 
effect sizes of entrepreneurship education do not significantly vary with the time lag between 
the start of a business and the timing of the survey. Thus, the risk of recall bias seems to be 
low, although we cannot completely rule out this possibility. Seventh, the high correlations 
among institutional variables precluded testing a comprehensive model including all 
institutional variables. This raises another interesting question for future research, namely 
whether and when institutions in a country converge to a consistent framework. Eighth, 
previous studies measured entrepreneurship education in terms of taking entrepreneurship 
courses (e.g., Gielnik et al., 2015; Souitaris et al., 2007), whereas our study adopted a 
perceptual measure. These differences might affect the comparability of the respective 
findings. Finally, since this study focused on five institutional variables drawn from Whitley’s 
(1999) framework, future research could corroborate our findings by testing other institutions 




Contributing to an institutional view of entrepreneurship education, we have mapped 
out how entrepreneurship education is more likely to result in entrepreneurial activity in 
entrepreneurship-hostile country environments. Being aware of institutional contingencies 
helps policy makers and educators more closely align entrepreneurship education to the 
specific country context and evaluate its outcomes in a context-dependent way. 
Entrepreneurship researchers can use the institutional lens to leave the confined space of 
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Fig. 1. Moderating effects of entrepreneur-friendly regulations, financial capital availability, control of corruption and public image of entrepreneurs. 
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1 Austria 267 0.20 2.39 1.10 4.31 9.48 1.94 0.51 38822.70 
2 Belgium 359 0.12 2.27 2.05 4.33 10.62 1.36 0.54 36433.14 
3 Bulgaria 224 0.16 2.40 -2.91 3.28 10.44 -0.12 0.40 13908.33 
4 China 562 0.30 2.71 -4.08 3.27 6.84 -0.57 0.40 6811.17 
5 Croatia 203 0.19 2.42 -3.39 3.27 10.60 0.05 0.32 19999.78 
6 Cyprus 247 0.26 2.59 0.18 3.94 9.39 1.04 0.48 28557.98 
7 Czech Republic 467 0.22 2.34 -3.97 3.60 13.07 0.33 0.42 25578.46 
8 Denmark 326 0.10 2.31 3.21 4.81 11.17 2.46 0.83 37845.50 
9 Estonia 251 0.16 2.26 -0.58 4.34 12.09 0.92 0.54 19698.54 
10 Finland 245 0.25 2.47 3.54 5.11 9.79 2.39 0.81 35259.67 
11 France 512 0.11 2.17 1.38 4.43 10.06 1.40 0.61 34787.54 
12 Germany 509 0.19 2.28 1.78 4.26 11.86 1.76 0.44 36372.33 
13 Greece 494 0.32 2.18 -3.56 3.77 9.67 0.21 0.40 29677.60 
14 Hungary 431 0.18 2.15 -1.38 3.50 11.70 0.49 0.29 20296.14 
15 Iceland 360 0.18 2.58 2.94 4.41 10.03 2.22 0.86 36802.64 
16 Ireland 242 0.21 2.27 2.48 4.43 11.67 1.64 0.66 40619.39 
17 Italy 532 0.24 2.26 -2.24 3.29 9.02 0.18 0.62 32684.65 
18 Japan 442 0.22 2.19 1.33 4.20 11.16 1.31 0.32 32426.05 
19 Latvia 194 0.14 2.01 -0.35 3.36 10.10 0.20 0.52 14305.72 
20 Lithuania 247 0.15 2.24 -0.62 3.88 10.62 0.17 0.47 17362.86 
21 Luxembourg 243 0.14 2.29 -0.06 4.77 10.34 1.94 0.59 84645.70 
22 Netherlands 537 0.19 2.35 2.67 4.90 11.07 2.11 0.58 40679.30 
23 Norway 316 0.14 2.44 2.95 5.11 11.91 2.00 0.65 56541.95 
24 Poland 450 0.25 2.37 -4.02 3.68 10.91 0.28 0.32 18896.86 
25 Romania 161 0.15 2.65 -2.49 3.33 10.37 -0.20 0.50 14286.24 
26 Slovenia 189 0.13 2.36 -2.19 3.81 11.76 0.96 0.42 27149.46 
27 South Korea 270 0.41 2.49 -0.49 3.86 11.25 0.44 0.31 27099.95 
28 Spain 525 0.19 2.49 -2.60 3.94 10.00 1.13 0.49 31607.75 
29 Sweden 245 0.11 2.26 2.45 5.01 11.97 2.21 0.56 37698.17 
30 Switzerland 247 0.19 2.48 1.88 4.51 11.13 2.10 0.56 44910.96 
31 United Kingdom 443 0.17 1.99 2.14 4.90 11.05 1.72 0.49 35182.76 
32 USA 490 0.29 2.74 2.84 5.04 13.14 1.43 0.75 45934.27 
a Source: Flash Eurobarometer Survey No. 283 (2010). b Sources: WB Doing Business Database (2004-2010) for start-up and bankruptcy regulations; IMD World Competitiveness 
Yearbook (2004-2010) for intellectual property rights. c Source: WEF Global Competitiveness Report (2004-2010). d Source: Educational Attainment Dataset (2004-2010) e Source: 
WB World Governance Indicators (2004-2010).  
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Table 2. Results for tests of measurement invariance 
Test Model df Χ2   RMSEA SRMSR CFI Δdf ΔΧ2   ΔCFI 
1 Invariant covariance matrices 310 2648.86 *** 0.12 0.13 0.92 . . 
 
. 
2 Configural invariance 64 343.07 *** 0.09 0.01 0.99 . . 
 
. 
3 Metric invariance 157 527.52 *** 0.07 0.05 0.99 93 184.45 *** 0.00 
4 Scalar invariance 250 1646.65 *** 0.10 0.05 0.95 93 1119.13 *** -0.04 
t p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlationsa 
 Variable Mean SD 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   
Individual level                                         
1. Entrepreneurial activity .20 .40 - 
                                     2. Entrepreneurship education 2.35 .71 .09 *** - 
                                   Country level                                 
3. Entrepreneur-friendly regulations .00 2.51 -.06 *** -.02 * - 
                                 4. Financial capital availability 4.15 .61 -.05 *** -.01  .86 *** -                                5. Educational capital availability 1.76 1.23 -.04 *** -.05 *** .28 
 
.37 * - 
                             6. Control of corruption 1.11 .88 -.08 *** -.03 ** .88 *** .91 *** .29 
 
- 
                           7. Public image of entrepreneurs .52 .15 -.05 *** .06 *** .69 *** .65 *** .03 
 
.66 *** - 
                         Control variables                                  
8. Gdp (ppp) per capita 31,965.11 14,592.96 -.04 *** -.02 t .57 *** .73 *** .24 
 
.73 *** .48 ** - 
                       9. Age 43.85 10.96 .09 *** -.03 *** .15 *** .12 *** .17 *** .14 *** .05 *** .09 *** - 










-.02 t - 
                   11. Education level 14.28 3.23 -.02 * .15 *** .09 *** .11 *** .08 *** .09 *** .14 *** .07 *** -.07 *** .01 
 
- 
                 12. Self-employed father .24 .43 .15 *** .06 *** .04 *** .05 *** -.09 *** .06 *** .02 * .05 *** .00 
 
.02 t .01 
 
- 




-.04 *** .46 *** - 
             14. Risk tolerance 2.77 .79 .11 *** .16 *** -.01 
 
.03 *** -.03 ** -.01 
 
.09 *** .04 *** -.09 *** .10 *** .06 *** .03 *** .01 
 
- 
           15. Self-confidence 3.12 .63 .05 *** .11 *** .07 *** .08 *** .01 
 




.26 *** - 
         16. Internal locus of control 3.18 .70 .04 *** .10 *** .04 *** .05 *** .03 ** .01 
 








.16 *** .29 *** - 
       17. Inventiveness 3.07 .69 .09 *** .16 *** .02 
 
.03 ** -.02 t .03 ** .09 *** .05 *** -.04 *** .06 *** .09 *** .02 t .00 
 
.28 *** .31 *** .22 *** - 




-.07 *** -.04 *** .09 *** .02 t -.09 *** .19 *** .00 
 
.02 ** .00 
 
.30 *** .22 *** .16 *** .22 *** - 
   19. Proactivity 3.07 .66 .06 *** .11 *** .06 *** .09 *** .06 *** .07 *** .09 *** .11 *** -.03 ** .04 *** .03 *** .01 
 
-.02 * .22 *** .29 *** .27 *** .28 *** .20 *** - 
 20. Optimism 3.06 .75 .05 *** .15 *** .11 *** .15 *** .06 *** .12 *** .13 *** .10 *** -.06 *** .02 * .11 *** .02 * .02 t .22 *** .30 *** .25 *** .27 *** .20 *** .23 *** 
a n = 11,230 for evaluating pairwise correlations between individual-level variables or between individual- and country-level variables; n = 32 for evaluating pairwise correlations 
between country-level variables.  
t p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 (two-tailed test). 
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Control variables (individual level) 
                       
 
Age .03 *** .00 
 
.03 *** .00 
 
.03 *** .00 
 
.03 *** .00 
 
.03 *** .00 
 
.03 *** .00 
 
Male .62 *** .06 
 
.62 *** .06 
 
.62 *** .06 
 
.63 *** .06 
 
.62 *** .06 
 
.63 *** .06 
 




















Self-employed father .58 *** .06 
 
.57 *** .06 
 
.58 *** .06 
 
.57 *** .06 
 
.57 *** .06 
 
.57 *** .06 
 
Self-employed mother .46 *** .07 
 
.45 *** .07 
 
.46 *** .07 
 
.46 *** .07 
 
.46 *** .07 
 
.46 *** .07 
 
Risk tolerance .28 *** .05 
 
.27 *** .05 
 
.27 *** .05 
 
.27 *** .05 
 
.27 *** .05 
 


















































Inventiveness .20 *** .03 
 
.19 *** .03 
 
.19 *** .03 
 
.19 *** .03 
 
.19 *** .03 
 
.19 *** .03 
 
























Proactivity .11 *** .03 
 
.10 *** .03 
 
.10 *** .03 
 
.10 *** .03 
 
.10 *** .03 
 

























              Control variable (country level)                        
 
Gdp (ppp) per capita .00 * .00 
 

















              Main effect (individual level) 
                       
 
Entrepreneurship education 
    
.18 *** .05 
     
.16 *** .04 
 
.18 *** .05 
 
.17 *** .04 
            Main effects (country level) 
                       
 
Entrepreneur-friendly regulations 
        
-.06 * .03 
 
-.05 * .03 
        
 
Financial capital availability 









Educational capital availability 
                       
 
Control of corruption 
                       
 
Public image of entrepreneurs 
                       Interaction effects (cross-level) 
                       
 
Entrepreneurship education X entrepreneur-friendly regulations 
            
-.04 ** .01 
        
 
Entrepreneurship education X financial capital availability 
                    
-.14 * .07 
 
Entrepreneurship education X educational capital availability 
                       
 
Entrepreneurship education X control of corruption 
                       
 
Entrepreneurship education X public image of the entrepreneur 
                              
 
Deviance 31022.74 
   
30999.05 
   
30995.13 
   
30986.99 
   
30996.75 
   
30991.54 
   Deviance difference (Chi-sqr) 710.44 ***   734.13 ***  738.04 ***   746.19 ***   736.43 ***   741.64 ***  
a Individual-level n = 11,230; country-level n = 32. Robust standard errors are reported. 
t p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed test). 
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Control variables (individual level) 
                       
 
Age .03 *** .00 
 
.03 *** .00 
 
.03 *** .00 
 
.03 *** .00 
 
.03 *** .00 
 
.03 *** .00 
 
Male .62 *** .06 
 
.62 *** .06 
 
.62 *** .06 
 
.63 *** .06 
 
.62 *** .06 
 
.62 *** .06 
 
Education level -.02 t .01 
 
-.02 t .01 
 












Self-employed father .57 *** .06 
 
.57 *** .06 
 
.58 *** .06 
 
.58 *** .06 
 
.57 *** .06 
 
.57 *** .06 
 
Self-employed mother .45 *** .07 
 
.45 *** .07 
 
.46 *** .07 
 
.46 *** .07 
 
.46 *** .07 
 
.46 *** .07 
 
Risk tolerance .27 *** .05 
 
.27 *** .05 
 
.27 *** .05 
 
.27 *** .05 
 
.27 *** .05 
 


















































Inventiveness .19 *** .03 
 
.19 *** .03 
 
.19 *** .03 
 
.19 *** .03 
 
.19 *** .03 
 
.19 *** .03 
 
























Proactivity .10 *** .03 
 
.10 *** .03 
 
.10 *** .03 
 
.10 *** .03 
 
.10 *** .03 
 

























              Control variable (country level)                        
 
Gdp (ppp) per capita .00 ** .00 
 

















              Main effect (individual level) 
                       
 
Entrepreneurship education .18 *** .05 
 
.18 *** .05 
 
.18 *** .05 
 
.16 *** .04 
 
.18 *** .05 
 
.17 *** .04 
                  Main effects (country level) 
                       
 
Entrepreneur-friendly regulations 
                       
 
Financial capital availability 
                       
 







                
 
Control of corruption 
        
-.27 * .10 
 
-.26 * .10 
        
 
Public image of entrepreneurs 








    Interaction effects (cross-level) 
                       
 
Entrepreneurship education X entrepreneur-friendly regulations 
                       
 
Entrepreneurship education X financial capital availability 
                       
 
Entrepreneurship education X educational capital availability 




                
 
Entrepreneurship education X control of corruption 
            
-.11 * .04 
        
 
Entrepreneurship education X public image of the entrepreneur 
                    
-.53 ** .19 
         
 
Deviance 30999.03 
   
30998.75 
   
30992.21 
   
30985.93 
   
30996.53 
   
30991.77 
   Deviance difference (Chi-sqr) 734.15 ***   734.42 ***   740.97 ***   747.25 ***   736.65 ***   741.41 ***  
a Individual-level n = 11,230; country-level n = 32. Robust standard errors are reported. 
t p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed test). 
 
